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ABSTRAcT
This paper aims to examine the relationship between ERM and firm value in Malaysia. In the past literature, ERM had been 
argued to increase firm value but empirical evidence shows mixed and inconclusive results. Using sample from 2004 to 
2012, this paper furthers the analysis on the relationship between ERM and firm performance among technology firms in 
Malaysia. Indeed, technology industry is the fastest growing and a volatile industry, which requires continuous innovation. 
These make technology firms more prone to risk exposure. In analyzing this issue, dynamic panel data is employed to 
allow cross-sectional and time series analysis. Our results show that the implementation of ERM in the previous year has 
strong negative relationship with firm value at 1 percent significance level. It supports the argument that the effect of ERM 
is not immediately realized as well as entails high implementation cost. The findings provide useful input and insight in 
formulating new policy in relation to corporate governance, particularly ERM in Malaysia. 
Keywords: Enterprise risk management; ERM; risk management; firm value; firm performance
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini bertujuan untuk melihat hubungan di antara ERM dan nilai firma di Malaysia. Dalam kajian-kajian lepas, 
ERM dikatakan mampu untuk meningkatkan nilai firma tetapi bukti empirikal menunjukkan dapatan yang bercampur-
campur dan berbeza-beza. Dengan menggunakan sampel dari tahun 2004-2012, kajian ini menganalisis hubungan di 
antara ERM and nilai firma di kalangan firma-firma berasaskan teknologi di Malaysia. Ini adalah kerana sektor teknologi 
merupakan industri yang berkembang pesat dan mempunyai kemeruapan yang tinggi, di samping memerlukan inovasi 
yang berterusan. Ini menyebabkan firma-firma teknologi lebih terdedah kepada risiko. Untuk menganalisis dan mengupas 
isu ini, data panel dinamik digunakan untuk membolehkan analisis keratan rentas dan siri masa dibuat. Hasil daripada 
kajian ini mendapati bahawa perlaksanaan ERM pada tahun sebelumnya mempunyai hubungan negatif dengan nilai 
firma pada aras keertian 1 peratus dan seterusnya menyokong pendapat yang mengatakan bahawa kesan perlaksanaan 
ERM tidak akan dapat dilihat serta merta dan juga perlaksanaan ERM memerlukan kos yang tinggi. Kajian ini juga 
memberikan input dan pandangan yang berguna dalam memformulasi polisi berkaitan dengan urus tadbir, terutama 
perlaksanaan ERM di Malaysia. 
Kata kunci: Pengurusan risiko enterprise; ERM; pengurusan risiko; nilai firma; prestasi firma
INTRODUCTION
Corporate risk management has become more important 
for businesses particularly in today’s dynamic and 
emerging risk environment. Indeed, risk management 
as an essential part of corporate governance, vital for 
a firm in preserving its shareholder’s interests as well 
as other stakeholders of the firm. In recent years, the 
approach of managing risk has shifted from silo to 
holistic approach, known as enterprise risk management 
(ERM). Silo approach limits the coordination between 
departments, resulting in inefficiencies in the distribution 
of risk management expenses (Hoyt & Liebenberg 
2011). Therefore, ERM has emerged to improve on 
the traditional approach by coordinating overall risk 
exposures within the organization, in conjunction to 
risk appetite and corporate strategies. According to Lam 
(2003), effective risk management demands businesses to 
deal with both underlying risk and the interrelationships 
between risks.
The importance and benefits of ERM coupled with 
the increasing trend of ERM have motivated increasing 
research in this area. One of the major issues that had 
been examined includes the implications of ERM on firm 
performance. Although modern finance theories assert that 
risk management is irrelevant to firm value (see Markowitz 
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1952; Modigliani & Miller 1958; Sharpe 1964), the 
proponents of corporate risk management suggest that 
corporate risk management increases firm value, subject to 
the effectiveness of risk management in minimizing costs 
associate with imperfect capital market (Froot, Scharfstein 
& Stein 1993; Meulbroek 2002; Nocco & Stulz 2006; 
Smith & Stulz 1985; Stulz 1996; Tufano 1998). 
However, empirical evidence from the perspective 
of ERM is rather mixed and ambiguous. Several studies 
find positive correlation between ERM implementation 
and firm performance or firm value (Baxter, Bedard, 
Hoitash & Yezegel 2013; Beasley, Pagach & Warr 2008; 
Gordon, Leob & Tseng 2009; Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011), 
while others find negative relationship (Lin, Wen & Yu 
2012). Nevertheless, two studies have been conducted 
in Malaysia examining the relationship between ERM 
and firm value creation. Specifically, Manab, Kassim 
and Hussin (2010) concluded that the main objective of 
financial firm of implementing ERM is business survival 
rather than value creation; whereas Tahir and Razali (2011) 
found no evidence in the relationship between ERM and 
Tobin’s Q. The inconsistency in the evidence could be due 
to different measurements of ERM implementation, sample 
and time period. According to Bowling and Rieger (2005) 
and Gates (2006), ERM takes years to be fully implemented 
and to see the benefits. In other words, the benefits of ERM 
implementation could only be seen after one year or even 
a longer period. Indeed, this particular issue has been 
overlooked as most of the past studies employed static 
model to examine the relationship between ERM and firm 
value. Although this issue was initially raised by Hoyt 
and Liebenberg (2011), no further empirical test has been 
conducted. Therefore, this paper attempts to examine this 
issue by using dynamic panel model among technology 
firms in Malaysia from 2004 to 2012.
This paper enriches the rising literature of ERM by 
providing evidence from the emerging market as well 
as from a specific non-financial industry, i.e. technology 
sector. Indeed, most existing studies focus on insurance or 
banking industry (see Hoyt & Liebenberg 2011; McShane, 
Nair & Rustambekov 2011; Lin et al. 2012; Baxter 
et al. 2013) and limited study has been conducted on a 
specific non-financial industry. Furthermore, technology 
sector plays important roles in the economy and 
becomes the source of other industry to capture dynamic 
business environment including quality, productivity and 
profitability improvement. Indeed, technology industry 
is very volatile, requiring continuous innovation and 
technological improvement. Apart from being relentless 
in innovation to meet consumer demands (Ernst & Young 
2014), technology firms are facing high competition that 
forces them to change corporate strategy. More technology 
firms are moving towards merger and acquisition and 
global expansion to maintain market share. According 
to the BDO Technology Risk Factor Report in 20141, 
competition and high pricing pressure are the most 
cited risks for technology industry in the U.S. Therefore, 
relentless innovation, high completion and increasing in 
size would make technology firms more prone to risk 
exposure. 
The following sections are structured as follows. 
First, we present a brief literature on the relationship 
between ERM and firm value. Research design is presented 
in second section which includes sample selection, data 
collection, empirical method and hypothesis as well as 
regression model. Third, we depict empirical findings. 
Finally, conclusion and suggestion for future research are 
presented in the final section.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Generally, ERM means managing full range of risks 
relevant to the firm by considering interrelation across 
risks. Indeed, good corporate governance through ERM 
manages risk exposure within a company’s risk appetite 
as to ensure resources are appropriately allocated 
and maintain shareholder value creation. As a broad 
concept, ERM can be interpreted in different ways from 
one profession to another, based on the needs and 
priorities in managing different type and magnitude of 
risks. For example, Casualty Actuarial Society (2003) 
defines ERM as “the discipline by which an organization 
in any industry assesses, controls, exploits, finances, 
and monitors risks from all sources for the purpose of 
increasing the organization’s short- and long-term value 
to its stakeholders”; while Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) 
(2004) describes ERM as “a process, effected by an entity’s 
board of directors, management and other personnel, 
applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, 
designed to identify potential events that may affect the 
entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to 
provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement 
of entity objectives.” Despite various ERM definitions, the 
underlying of ERM concept is to deal with risks in holistic 
manner; and this done by considering both systematic and 
unsystematic risks. Indeed, ERM allows construction of 
risk portfolio; and Kleffner, Lee and McGannon (2003) 
suggested that portfolio approach and risk management 
are similar when one holds diverse investment portfolio. 
In other words, negative correlated risks will offset each 
other and result in lower total risk exposure. Furthermore, 
diversification strategy is able to minimize upside and 
downside risks for better performance in various economic 
circumstances (Catherine & Nurul Izza 2009).
In the past, scholars argued that risk management 
increases firm value through the effectiveness of risk 
management to reduce costs associate to imperfect 
capital market (e.g. Smith & Stulz 1985; Stulz 1996; 
Froot et al. 1993; Tufano 1998; Meulbroek 2002; Nocco 
& Stulz 2006). For instance, Stulz (1996) argued that 
only firms with lower tail outcomes will benefit from 
risk management, while other firms will see no benefit 
and could destroy the value by spending corporate their 
resources on risk management. As such, elimination 
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of costly lower-tail outcomes2 is the main objective of 
risk management (Stulz 1996). Indeed, costly lower-tail 
outcomes are the sources of financial distress cost and 
may prevent the implementation of investment strategy. 
Furthermore, by minimizing the likelihood of financial 
distress, risk management (or specifically hedging) also 
enhances debt capacity (Stulz 1996; Leland 1998). As debt 
capacity increases, firm will be able to borrow more and 
increase its leverage. As a result, interest on debt increases 
and reduction in tax payment; which consequently 
enhanced firm value. In other words, high debt capacity 
(or high leverage) provides the incentive for hedging 
in consideration of the tax saving gained from interest 
deduction. In sum, lower-tail outcomes can be minimized 
as to smooth earnings and cash flow through reduction of 
total risk exposure (Kraus & Lehner 2012). 
Consistently, the adoption of ERM decreases the 
volatility of stock price and earnings, reduces external 
capital costs, increases capital efficiency and creates 
synergies between different risk management activities 
(Miccolis & Shah 2000; Meulbroek 2002). According to 
Nocco and Stulz (2006), a well-designed ERM allows a firm 
to access capital market and other resources to maintain 
profitable growth of the firm. Therefore, managers must be 
able to utilize risk profile in evaluating risk-return tradeoff 
in their investment decisions within firm risk appetite. 
More important, ERM is capable of reducing earnings 
volatility from different sources of risks to prevent risk 
aggregation (Hoyt & Liebenberg 2011). In fact, any 
increase in total risk might possibly result in loss of value; 
and in the event the company forgoes a profitable project 
with positive net present value, the loss of value signifies 
permanent drop in value (Nocco & Stulz 2006). However, 
costs and benefits of ERM are firm specific (Beasley et al. 
2008) and differ from one firm to another.
Nevertheless, empirical evidence on the relationship 
between ERM and firm performance or value is mixed and 
inconclusive. Prior to ERM, some studies on the relationship 
between traditional risk management (proxied by hedging 
or derivatives) and firm value demonstrated positive 
results (see Allayannis & Weston 2001; Carter, Rogers 
& Simkins 2006; Graham & Rogers 2002). Consistently, 
Beasley et al (2008) showed positive association between 
ERM adoption and firm performance. Specifically, they 
found that large non-financial firms with higher earnings 
volatility, lower leverage and limited cash reserves, and 
financial firms with limited cash reserves and higher 
leverage are likely to benefit from ERM adoption. These 
findings suggest that not all firms could taste the benefits 
of ERM; consistent with the argument of Stulz (1996). 
Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) discovered that ERM 
is positively correlated to firm value (as measured by 
Tobin’s Q) in the U.S insurance industry from 1998 to 
2005. Specifically, Q ratio for insurance companies that 
engaged in ERM is 20 percent higher than other insurance 
companies. Baxter et al. (2013) analyzed valuation effect 
of ERM in the U.S insurance and banking sector and found 
consistent results with Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011). The 
adoption of ERM leads to an increase of 1.14 percent 
and 3.40 percent in ROA and Tobin’s Q, respectively. 
More interesting findings are being reported in Beasley 
et al. (2008). Using ERM index to proxy ERM adoption, 
Gordon et al (2009) found consistent evidence as Beasley 
et al. (2008); but the relationship between ERM and firm 
performance (measured by one year excess stock market 
return) depends on the accuracy to match ERM with firm 
specific’s factors, i.e. environmental uncertainty, industry 
competition, firm size, firm complexity and monitoring by 
the board of directors. 
On the other hand, Lin et al. (2012) suggested that 
ERM adoption can be a value destructor. They conducted a 
study on 85 publicly traded property and casualty insurers 
in the U.S. from 2000-2007. Lin et al. (2012) used both 
economic value and accounting based measurement, i.e. 
Tobin’s Q and ROA to proxy firm value. Their analysis 
showed a negative association between ERM and firm 
value. Specifically, ERM adoption leads to 5% and 4% 
reductions in Tobin’s Q and ROA respectively. They 
argued that the negative association could be due to ERM 
complexity (Fraser, Schoening-Thiessen & Simkins 2008) 
and the high cost of ERM implementation (Beasley et al. 
2008; Pagach & Warr 2010). This finding is similar to 
the conclusion found in corporate hedging studies (see 
Callahan 2002; Jin & Jorion 2006; Khediri & Folus 
2010).
Using ERM rating, McShane et al. (2011) found no 
evidence of increasing value as ERM takes place among 
insurance companies in the U.S. Specifically, they found 
that firm value increases as more sophisticated TRM takes 
place; but this does not increase as firm achieves ERM. 
In the emerging market, Manab et al. (2010) discovered 
that the main objective of EWRM adoption among 
financial companies in Malaysia is survival rather than 
value creation. Moreover, Tahir and Razali (2011) and 
Chen (2012) found insignificant result for public listed 
companies in Malaysia and Taiwan, respectively.
The discussion on the above literature is mostly based 
on static model, which indicates the immediate effect of 
ERM. However, ERM takes time to be fully implemented 
and effects of ERM on firm performance may not be 
immediately realized. Therefore, it is worth to examine this 
issue of enriching the dimension by the way ERM affects 
firm performance or value.
RESEARCH DESIGN
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION
The sample for this paper is technology industry in 
Malaysia based on industry classification by Osiris. The 
period of 2004 to 2012 is chosen as ERM becomes a global 
issue after the publication of Enterprise Risk Management 
Framework by Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
of the Treadway Commission (COSO) in 2004. Most of the 
data are only available up to 2012. To be included, a firm 
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must be listed on Bursa Malaysia before or on the year 
2004 and each firm must have all the data of the variables 
used to support research framework and the hypotheses. 
This is very important as to ensure that the result is not 
affected by the sample with incomplete data (de Vaus 
2002). Furthermore, all companies (ERM user or non-user) 
that meet the criteria are included in the research sample. 
Initial sample from Osiris database is 108 technology 
firms. After eliminating firms with incomplete data, our 
final sample is reduced to 26 firms. Out of 26, only nine 
firms are ERM users and 15 firms are non-users. The total 
of 26 technology firms yielded 236 firm-year observations. 
However, as this study employs dynamic model which 
involves lag variables, the firm-year observation reduces 
to 208.
Financial data are collected from Osiris. However, 
for ERM activity identification, we go through each 
firm’s annual report from 2004 to 2012 as ERM adoption 
cannot be easily observed. Specifically, we perform 
separate keyword searches for each firm using individual 
words, axiom and acronyms. This approach had been 
used in the past literature (see Chen 2012; Golshan 
& Rasid 2012; Hoyt & Liebenberg 2011; Liebenberg 
& Hoyt 2003). The keywords include “enterprise risk 
management,” “enterprise-wide risk management,” 
“chief risk officer,” “risk committee,” “strategic risk 
management,” “consolidated risk management” , “holistic 
risk management,” “comprehensive risk management” and 
“integrated risk management.” The first four keywords 
are prominent terminologies in recent years and the 
remaining is identical to ERM (Liebenberg & Hoyt 2003). 
We review each of the results in the context of enterprise 
risk management to decide whether each result refers to 
ERM implementation. Finally, each result that refers to 
ERM is coded and dated in accordance to the key word 
that generates the results.
EMPIRICAL METHOD
This study aims to examine the relationship between ERM 
and firm value in Malaysian context. Following the past 
literature in risk management, we employ Tobin’s Q to 
represent firm value. Tobin’s Q is calculated by dividing 
the sum of market value of equity plus book value of 
liability with book value to assets, a similar measurement 
used in Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) and McShane et al. 
(2011). Indeed, Tobin’s Q has been used to quantify the 
valuation effect of several firm characteristics such as 
firm size (e.g. Allayannis & Weston 2001; Beasley et al. 
2008; Tahir & Razali 2011), leverage (Chen 2012; Lin et 
al. 2012; Razali, Yazid & Tahir 2011), profitability (e.g. 
Allayannis & Weston 2001; Hoyt & Liebenberg 2011; 
Tahir & Razali 2011), cash reserves (Beasley et al. 2008) 
and growth opportunity (Allayannis & Weston 2001; Jin 
& Jorion 2006; Lin et al. 2012). Furthermore, nine out of 
10 studies had employed Tobin’s Q as a measure for firm 
value in the literature of traditional risk management from 
2001-2005 (Smithson & Simkins 2005).
Specifically, Tobin’s Q is modelled as a function of 
ERM and five control variables. ERM is defined as 1 for 
firm-years beginning with first evidence of ERM usage and 
subsequent years, and equal to 0 for firm-years before the 
ERM adoption. For instance, a firm adopted ERM in 2007 
will be assigned the value 1 for years 2007 to 2012 and 
0 before year 2007, i.e. 2004-2006. This measure has 
been adopted in Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011). ERM needs 
time to be fully implemented (Bowling & Rieger 2005; 
Gates 2006) and its effect on firm value may take time 
to realize (Hoyt & Liebenberg 2011). Some of studies on 
the relationship between ERM and firm performance find 
positive relationship (Beasley et al. 2008; Gordon et al. 
2009; Hoyt & Liebenberg 2011; Baxter et al. 2013) and 
support the theoretical argument on the valuation effect 
of ERM (Meulbroek 2002; Miccolis & Shah 2000; Nocco 
& Stulz 2006). However, ERM is often viewed as a costly 
program and may harm the shareholders’ interest if the 
cost of ERM is greater than it benefits (Beasley et al. 2008; 
Pagach & Warr 2010). This cost could be arisen from the 
organization’s risk culture (Rochette 2009) and greater 
necessity for human resources and information technology 
system (McShane et al. 2011). Subsequently, ERM requires 
longer period to be fully implemented (Bowling & 
Rieger 2005; Gates 2006), and this could further increase 
implementation cost. As ERM implementation in Malaysia 
is still in the early stage (Tahir & Razali 2011), it may 
lead to high cost of ERM implementation; due to lack of 
expertise as well as low level awareness on the entire ERM 
program. Therefore, based on this argument, we expect 
the ERM implementation in the previous year has negative 
association with firm value in the following year.
Empirical finding from past studies suggest that other 
attributes may affect firm value such as firm size, leverage, 
profitability, cash reserves and growth opportunity. Indeed, 
firm leverage and firm size are the most cited control 
variables in the study of risk management (Allayannis & 
Weston 2001; Anderson, Duru & Reeb 2009). 
Firm Size Past literature argued that as a firm becomes 
larger (or become public companies), agency conflict is 
likely to occur (e.g. Jensen & Meckling 1976; Jensen 
1986). Indeed, the agency conflict between managers and 
shareholders erodes shareholder wealth, and subsequently 
reduces firm value. Allayannis and Weston (2001), Carter 
et al. (2006) and Tahir and Razali (2011) found negative 
correlation between firm size and Tobin’s Q. However, 
larger firm has greater resources and diverse expertise to 
increase firm value through mass production (Majumdar 
1997) or manage strategic risks effectively. On empirical 
evidence, Jin and Jorion (2010), Beasley et al. (2008), 
Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) and Lin et al. (2012) 
demonstrated a positive link between firm size and firm 
value. Following to Pagach and Warr (2011) and Golshan 
and Rasid (2012), we use natural logarithm of total assets 
to measure firm.
Leverage For non-financial firms, total liability to market 
value of equity (i.e. debt to equity ratio) is the common 
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proxy for firm leverage (e.g. Beasley et al. 2008; Razali 
et al. 2011; Tahir & Razali 2011). Therefore, we measure 
leverage by utilizing debt to equity ratio. Jensen (1986) 
suggested that the inclusion of debt in firm capital structure 
can reduce the cash available to managers through the 
minimization of agency cost of free cash flow. However, 
greater leverage could increase firm risk and exposure to 
financial distress as well as underinvestment problem. In 
other words, high level of debt may limit the ability of 
the firm to seize the opportunities to invest in projects 
with positive net present value. Consequently, financially 
distressed firms are prone to reduction in debt ratings and 
have higher borrowing costs (Beasley et al. 2008). On the 
empirical evidences, Beasley et al. (2008), McShane et al. 
(2011), Chen (2012) and Lin et al. (2012) found inverse 
correlation between leverage and firm value. Prior to ERM, 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) reported negative linkage 
between leverage and industry adjusted Q. 
Profitability Generally, profitability is the primary 
purpose of a firm. By having high profit, it shows that 
some firms generate higher revenue than costs. From 
investors’ perspective, profitable firms offer greater future 
opportunity; hence, making these firms more attractive. 
Indeed, Allayannis and Weston (2001) suggested that 
profitable firms tend to be traded at premium. On empirical 
evidence, profitability is positively correlated with firm 
performance (e.g. Allayannis & Weston 2001; Hoyt & 
Liebenberg, 2011; Tahir & Razali 2011). Thus, return on 
assets (ROA), calculated as net income divided by total 
assets, is included to control for profitability. 
Cash Reserves According to Smith and Stulz (1985), 
lower cash availability increases the possibility of levered 
firm to be financially distressed. Indeed, limited cash 
reserves and resources may force a firm to invest in any 
available fund for its corporate risk management as to 
protect firm value. This is because they might not be 
able to buffer any unexpected shocks or losses. Beasley 
et al. (2008) found that limited cash holding is one of the 
characteristics of financial and non-financial firms likely 
to benefit from ERM adoption. Similar to Beasley et al. 
(2008), we measure cash reserves as total cash or cash 
equivalent divided by total liability 
Growth Opportunity Lin et al. (2012) suggested that 
growth opportunity, as measured by three year premium 
growth, is positive and significant to Tobin’s Q. This 
finding is consistent with those studies of hedging such as 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Jin and Jorion (2006). 
Following Allayannis and Weston (2001), this study 
uses natural log of capital expenditure to total sales as a 
measurement for level of investment to facilitate future 
growth. Generally, lower ratio indicates better position as 
small fraction of capital could generate higher sales (and 
indicates greater investment growth prospect). As the 
market value of firm is the present value of all expected 
future cash flows (Myers 1977), lower CAPEX (or high 
investment growth) would increase firm value.
REGRESSION MODEL
Regression analysis is used to identify the relationship 
between dependent variables and explanatory variables. 
This study aims to examine the relationship between the 
implementation of ERM and firm value as measured by 
Tobin’s Q using the following dynamic panel model. 
Under this model, ERM is transformed into lag variable to 
examine the effect on firm value. Furthermore, all control 
variables are also converted into lagged variable as to 
avoid endogeneity problem (Altuntas, Berry-Stolzle & 
Hoyt 2011). Therefore, regression model for this study 
is shown below:
0 1 1 2 1 3 1
4 1 5 1 6 1
it it it it
it it it it
Q ERM SIZE LEV
CASH ROA CAPEX
b b b b
b b b e
− − −
− − −
= + + +
+ + + +
where, 
Q : Measures firm performance and
  calculated as log [(market value of
  equity + book value of liability)/
  book value of assets]
ERM : Dummy variable; 1 for firm-years
  beginning with first proof of ERM
  adoption and subsequent years, and
  0 for firm-years before the ERM 
SIZE : Measures firm size and calculated as
  natural logarithms of total assets
LEV : Measures firm leverage (total liabilities/
  market value of equity)
CASH : Measures cash reserves (Cash and cash
  equivalents/total liabilities)
ROA : Measures profitability (net income/total
  share outstanding)
CAPEX : Measures growth opportunity i.e. log
  (capital expenditures/total sales)
ε : Error term
As the sample comprises cross-sectional data and 
time series data (26 technology firms over the period of 
9 years, from 2004 to 2012), panel data methodology is 
employed in this paper. According to Baltagi (2008), panel 
data is able to produce results that are simply undetectable 
in pure cross-section or pure time-series data. However, 
regression test under panel data must be incorporated with 
specific method, either with random effect model or fixed 
effect model. Generally, fixed effect model assumes the 
differences in intercepts across the groups or time period, 
while random effect model looks at the differences in 
error terms. In choosing the appropriate estimation model 
for panel data, Hausman (1978) test is employed in most 
cases. It  basically tests whether individual effect is related 
to explanatory variables. The null hypothesis is that the 
effect is unrelated to explanatory variable. If the test is 
significant at, at least 0.05, fixed effect model is a better fit 
to the data compared to random effect model.3 Hausman 
test in Table 1 is significant at 0.01; and therefore, random 
effect model is rejected in favor of fixed effect model.
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Cash reserves, CASH is low as shown by mean score of 
1.14, median of 0.48 and 2.16 in standard deviation. This 
indicates that only 1.14 percent of firm’s total liabilities 
are financed by assets in the form of cash. However, the 
value of standard deviation signifies that cash reserves 
varied across technology firms in the samples. Growth 
opportunity, CAPEX is measured by percentage of total 
capital expenditure against total sales. Based on the 
descriptive statistics, it shows that firms in the samples 
have an average growth opportunity of 7.06 percent and a 
median of 3.40 percent. This result is slightly higher than 
mean value of 0.4 percent in Spano (2007). However, 
based on the standard deviation of 8.76 percent, there is 
a high significant dispersion in the growth opportunity 
among firms. This indicates the existence of firms with 
positive as well as negative growths. Firms’ return on 
assets (ROA) is highly dispersed as shown by standard 
deviation of 12.83 percent. On average, every RM1 asset 
only generates RM0.03 return across the sampled firms. 
TABLE 1. Hausman test
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.
Cross-section 19.4564 6 0.0035
random
In addition, White test and Wooldridge tests are 
used to detect the problems of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation, respectively. The findings of White test in 
Table 2 reveal the existence of heteroscedasticity problem. 
Specifically, it indicates that the variance of error terms 
is not constant across observations. Wooldridge test is 
conducted to test the null hypothesis i.e. existence of 
first order autocorrelation. Based on the result in Table 
3, the F-statistics are significant at 5 percent level; and 
therefore null hypothesis is rejected. To overcome these 
problems, robust standard error is often used as it is 
consistent to both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Indeed, Stock and Watson (2006) highlighted that in 
the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, 
robust standard error such as clustering is the ultimate 
choice. Therefore, as a remedial for heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation, robust standard error procedure is 
conducted using the statistical and econometric software 
available in Stata 12.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics that contain the 
values of mean, median and standard deviations of each 
variable. Firm performance as measured by log of Tobin’s 
Q is the dependent variable and ERM, SIZE, LEV, CASH, 
CAPEX and ROA are explanatory variables. The average 
firm value (Q) among technology firms is at 1.19 with a 
median of 0.996. However, the dispersion of firm value 
across the sample is relatively low as shown by standard 
deviation of 0.68. ERM has a mean score of 0.16, median 
of 0.00 and standard deviation of 0.37. Generally, there 
is low dispersion of ERM adoption among the samples. 
SIZE as measured by natural logarithms of total assets 
yields approximately RM134 million in mean (the anti-log 
of 11.80), RM98 million in median and RM3 million in 
standard deviation. Therefore, the average total assets in 
sample firms is RM133 million. On average, firms across 
the samples have more equity than debt in their capital 
structures as indicated by LEV mean value of 0.95. 
TABLE 2. Heteroscedasticity test: White
    
Chi-Square (n.R2) 72.69 Prob > Chi-Square 0.0000
 
TABLE 3. Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation
    
F-statistics (1, 25) 4.412 Prob > F-Statistics  0.0459
TABLE 4. Descriptive statistics
Variables N Mean Median Standard
    Deviation
Q 234 1.194 0.996 0.677
ERM 208 0.158 0.000 0.366
SIZE 208 11.808 11.495 1.117
LEV 208 0.951 0.598 1.178
CASH 208 1.144 0.475 2.158
CAPEX 208 7.061 3.401 8.759
ROA 208 3.196 3.813 12.831
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
The multivariate analysis is based on fixed effect method 
as Hausman test produces significant result (p-value 
= 0.0035). Table 5 reports the results of fixed effects 
dynamic panel with lag explanatory variables. Variance 
inflation factors (VIF) of each explanatory variable are 
below 4 and indicate the absence of serious collinearity 
problem; consistent with the maximum VIF value of 5 
as recommended by Rogerson (2001). Indeed, common 
acceptable VIF value is 10 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & 
Black 1995; Kennedy 1992). Moreover, the overall percent 
is correctly predicted as shown by R2 at approximately 73 
percent and 68 percent for adjusted R 2. 
Consistent with our prediction, ERM implementation in 
the previous year has strong negative association with firm 
value in the following year at 1 percent significance level. 
Specifically, ERM user firms are valued at approximately 
47 percent lower than non-user firms. This finding is 
consistent with Lin et al. (2012) in their analysis on the 
valuation effect of ERM in the U.S. insurance industry as 
well as the empirical findings of hedging (Callahan 2002; 
Jin & Jorion 2006; Khediri & Folus 2010). Indeed, the 
infancy stage of ERM in Malaysia (Tahir & Razali 2011) 
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and coupled with high cost of implementation (Beasley 
et al. 2008; McShane et al. 2011; Rochette 2009; Pagach 
& Warr 2010) may cause ERM to inversely affecting firm 
value among technology firms in Malaysia.
Three of the control variables are statistically 
significant in explaining firm value. SIZEt-1 has a strong 
influence in explaining firm performance. The negative 
sign of the SIZEt-1 coefficient indicates that as firm size 
increased in the previous year, it decreased firm value in 
the following year. Therefore, this finding supports the 
notion that agency conflict increases as firms grow (Jensen 
& Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986); and is consistent with 
the previous literature (Allayannis & Weston 2001; Carter 
et al. 2006; Tahir & Razali 2011). CASHt-1 is negatively 
correlated with firm value at 5 percent significance level. 
This means, large cash reserve in the previous year will 
decrease firm value in the following year. Interestingly, 
the effect of cash reserve is inconsistent with the argument 
by Smith and Stulz (1985). One of the explanations is that 
holding large cash allows managers to spend unwisely 
and this tends to go against shareholders’ interest (Jensen 
1986). Finally, CAPEXt-1 has negative effect on firm value 
at 10 percent significance level. However, this finding 
contradicts the result of Allayannis and Weston (2001), 
Jin and Jorion (2006) and Lin et al. (2012). It could be 
due to the harsh decision by managers to invest in non-
profitable project to serve short term self-benefits out of 
shareholders’ pocket. As a result, it decreases firm value 
in the long term.
adoption of ERM in the previous year has an adverse effect 
on firm value in the following year. It also supports the 
arguments by Bowling and Rieger (2005), Gates (2006) 
and Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) on the time constraint 
of implementing ERM. Furthermore, ERM practice in 
Malaysia is still in infancy stage (Tahir & Razali 2011) 
and lacks ERM expertise. Other reasons are that managers 
may encounter greater challenges in cultivating risk 
culture (Rochette 2009) and ERM requires high cost of 
implementation (see Beasley et al. 2008; Pagach & Warr 
2010) including investment in human resources and 
information technology system (McShane et al. 2011). In 
addition, firm size, cash reserves and opportunity growth 
are also significant in explaining firm value. 
The main finding of this study shows that ERM 
is negatively related to firm value and contradicts the 
arguments by corporate risk management proponents 
such as Smith and Stulz, (1985), Stulz (1996), Froot et 
al. (1993), Tufano (1998), Meulbroek (2002) and Nocco 
and Stulz (2006). However, ERM is firm specific and the 
approaches as well as resources deployment may vary 
among firms. Thus, the benefits and costs associated to 
ERM differ from one firm to another. Furthermore, findings 
of this study provide valuable insight for regulators in 
formulating policy and guidelines related to corporate 
governance in Malaysia. As ERM is a relatively new 
program in Malaysia, regulators could formulate policy 
to improve disclosure on financial position as well as risk 
profile. Indeed, greater disclosure on firm risk profile may 
help to reduce information asymmetry and subsequently 
adds value to the firm (Hoyt & Liebenberg 2011). In 
addition, the finding of this study can also be used to 
improve the awareness among listed companies that the 
valuation effect of ERM does not happen immediately. 
It requires ultimate commitments from all organization 
members as well as financial pledges as to ensure the 
success of ERM program and provides greater benefits in 
the long run. 
Similar to other studies in social science, this study 
also encounters several limitations. First, our key search 
approach in identifying ERM adoption may not be able 
to capture all the ERM activities. Furthermore, sample 
size of this study is relatively small with 234 firm-year 
observations from technology industry. It may affect the 
generalization of findings to other industry. However, 
several studies in the past had conducted their analyses 
on small sample size. For instance, McShane et al. (2011) 
only analyzed 82 observations while Baxter et al. (2013) 
utilized 165 firm-year observations. Future study may 
want to look into the overall industry and with longer 
time period. Another prospect of research is to examine 
the effect of mediating and moderating variables, such as 
agency cost and cost of capital to further understand the 
association between ERM and firm value. 
TABLE 5. Fixed effect regression results on firm value
Variables  Q Collinearity
   test (VIF)
Intercept  3.067 (3.66)*** 
ERMt-1  -0.469 (-35.63)*** 3.357
SIZEt-1  -0.245 (-3.49)*** 3.455
LEVt-1  -0.009 (-0.37) 3.258
CASHt-1  -0.019 (-2.06)** 3.260
CAPEXt-1  -0.047 (-1.78)* 3.290 
ROAt-1  0.002 (0.80) 3.249
R2 0.732 F-statistic 15.479
Adjusted R2 0.684 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000
N 208
Value in parentheses is t-statistic. 
***, ** and * are indicating 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, 
respectively.
CONCLUSION
This study attempts to examine the impact of ERM 
implementation on firm value, measured by the natural 
log of Tobin’s Q. The study employs fixed effect dynamic 
panel data to examine the valuation effect of ERM. Our 
findings support our prediction that ERM implementation 
is likely to affect firm performance adversely; consistent 
to the findings of Lin et al. (2012). Specifically, the 
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END NOTES
1 2015 BDO Technology Risk Factor Report, available online 
at http://www. bdointernational.com 
2 Stulz (1996) describes firms with lower tail outcomes 
as high leverage, limited cash reserves and volatile 
earnings.
3 If hypothesis null is rejected means that random effect 
model violates Gauss-Markov assumptions and become 
biased and inconsistent estimates. On the other hand, fixed 
effect model remains unbiased and consistent
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